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Abstract 
 
This paper compares centralized and decentralized price setting by a firm that sells a single 
product in two markets, but is constrained to set one price (e.g. due to arbitrage). Each market is 
characterized by a different linear demand function, and demand conditions are privately 
observed by a local manager. This manager only cares about profits in his own market and, as a 
result, communicates his information strategically. Our main results link organizational design to 
market demand. First, if pricing is decentralized, it is always delegated to the manager who faces 
the flattest inverse demand function, regardless of the size of market demand. Second, even when 
pricing can be allocated to an unbiased headquarters, decentralization is optimal when markets 
differ sufficiently in how flat the inverse demand functions are. Finally, decentralization is more 
likely when, in expectations, local managers disagree more about prices. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
*This paper was prepared for the invited session on "Decision-Making and Incentives in Organizations" 
at the EEA 2007 Meeting in Budapest. 
1 Introduction
When discussing issues such as pricing by a monopolist or oligopolistic firm, eco-
nomic textbooks typically assume that firms act as profit maximizers. In contrast,
much recent economic research has focussed on agency problems that may push
the managers of a firm away from profit maximization, and how organizations are
optimally designed to mitigate these. Perhaps surprisingly, at least given the his-
toric importance of Price Theory, price elasticities or product market competition
do not play a role in most of these theories. The aim of this paper is to link one of
the most basic questions in organizational economics — should decision-making be
centralized or delegated? – with one of the most basic questions in price theory –
how is pricing aﬀected by demand conditions?
Ever since Hayek (1945), economists have invoked "local knowledge" as a
reason to decentralize decision-making. In a world in which technological advances
have all but eliminated communication costs, one may wonder whether local knowl-
edge still matters. In response to this, Dessein (2002) and Alonso, Dessein and
Matouschek (forthcoming) have proposed a informational rationale for decentral-
ization that does not rely on physical communication constraints. As they show,
if a principal cannot commit to a formal mechanism to elicit information, decen-
tralization to biased but better informed agents is often optimal as this avoids that
agents distort their information in order to influence decision-making. The present
paper builds on these insights to analyze whether pricing decisions are optimally
made by an unbiased headquarters, which then bases its decision on information
communicated by local division managers, or whether pricing should be delegated.
In particular, we are interested how the shape of the demand function faced by each
division may aﬀect whether or not pricing decisions are decentralized.
In our model, a firm sells a product in two markets, but can only charge
one price due to arbitrage by retailers or consumers, legal constraints on price
discrimination or a "most favored customer" clause. The two markets diﬀer in their
(linear) demand, and demand conditions are privately observed by a local manager
who only cares about profits in his market (for example, due to career concerns).
Finally, the firm can only commit to an ex ante allocation of the pricing decision.
Our results the link organization design with the shape of the demand function:
(i) Conditional on decentralization, the pricing decision is always delegated to the
manager who faces the market with the flattest demand curve, even if that market
is much smaller (that is, the intercept is smaller).2 (ii) If both (inverse) demand
functions have the same slope, pricing is always centralized. (iii) If the diﬀerence
between the slopes of the demand function is beyond a threshold, it is always
optimal to decentralize pricing to the division with the flattest demand function.
(iv) When division managers diﬀer more in their preferred price, decentralization is
more likely.
2The only restriction is that it must be optimal to sell in both markets.
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2 The Model
A firm produces one good at zero costs and sells it in two markets. In each
market the firm faces uncertainty about the demand conditions. In particular, the
inverse demand function in Market j = 1, 2 is given by pj = aj − bjqj , where aj
is independently drawn from a uniform distribution with support
£
μj − s, μj + s
¤
,
where μj − s > 0 and (μ1 − μ2)2 < s2.3 The slopes of the inverse demand functions
satisfy b2 ≥ b1 > 0. Due to arbitrage, legal restrictions on price discrimination
or contractual commitments to customers (such as most favored customer clauses),
the firm needs to set the same price in both markets, i.e. p1 = p2 = p. The profits
in Market j = 1, 2 are then given by πj = pqj .
The firm consists of two operating divisions and, potentially, one headquarter
division. Each division is run by one manager. Manager 1 is in charge of the first
market and privately observes the realization of a1 while Manager 2 is in charge
of the second market and privately observes the realization of a2. Manager HQ is
in charge of headquarters and observes neither a1 nor a2. Manager j = 1, 2 only
cares about the profits of division j, πj , for example due to (unmodelled) career
concerns.4 Manager HQ, in contrast, cares equally about both divisions and thus
maximizes π1 + π2.
We follow the property rights literature (Grossman and Hart 1986) in as-
suming that contracts are highly incomplete. In particular, the organization only
commits to an ex ante allocation of the right to make the pricing decision.5 There are
three possible allocations of the decision right: under Centralization Manager HQ
has the right to make the decision while under Decentralization-j = 1, 2 Manager j
has the right to make the decision. Once the decision right has been allocated, it
cannot be transferred before the decision is made.
The lack of commitment implies that the decision-makers are not able to
commit to paying transfers that depend on the information they receive or to make
their decisions depend on such information in diﬀerent ways. Communication
therefore takes the form of an informal mechanism: cheap talk. For simplicity we
assume that this informal communication occurs in one round of communication.
3The latter assumption ensures that the variance of the intercepts σ2 = s3/3 is suﬃciently large
relative to the average diﬀerences in the intercepts and facilitates the analysis of the communication
game that we describe below.
4Our results can be extended to the case where Manager j, j = 1, 2, maximizes λπj +(1−λ)πi,
where i 6= j and λ ∈ (1/2, 1]. The parameter λ then captures how biased each division manager
is towards his own division’s profits. While a smaller bias favors decentralization, results are
qualitatively similar as long as λ > 1/2.
5 Internal contracting on pricing may be diﬃcult as courts are often unwilling to interfere with
internal firm matters. Negotiating a mechanism with division managers may also result in costly
bargaining or influence activities. As an empirical matter, Marin and Verdier (2007), Table A1,2,
report that product pricing and price increases are among the most decentralized decisions in their
sample of firms: only 4 out of 16 decisions (German firms) and 2 out of 13 decisions (Austrian
firms) are more decentralized.
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In particular, under Centralization, Managers 1 and 2 simultaneously send messages
m1 ∈M1 and m2 ∈M2 to headquarters. Since division managers do not care about
each other’s profits — and hence each other’s private information – communication
plays no role under Decentralization-j = 1, 2.
The timing of the game is as follows. First, the right to make the pricing
decision is allocated to maximize the total expected profits E [π1 + π2]. Second, the
division managers become informed about demand conditions in their markets, that
is, they learn a1 and a2 respectively. Third, if pricing is centralized, the division
managers communicate with the decision-maker. Finally, the pricing decision is
made.
3 Decision-Making
We start by analyzing the decisions that headquarters would make if it were per-
fectly informed about the demand conditions in both markets. If Manager HQ could
observe a1 and a2 herself, she would set the price that maximizes total firm profits
π1 + π2 =
X
j=1,2
"
a2j
4bj
− 1
bj
³
p− aj
2
´2#
. (1)
To understand this expression, note that a2j/4bj are the maximum profits that can
be earned in Market j = 1, 2. To realize these profits, the price needs to be set
equal to aj/2, which is the optimal price for Market j. If the firm sets a diﬀerent
price, then profits in Market j are reduced by an amount equal to the second term
on the RHS. In this sense the second term represents the cost of setting p 6= aj/2.
The price that maximizes (1) is given by
pFB =
1
1 + b1/b2
a1
2
+
b1/b2
1 + b1/b2
a2
2
,
where b1/b2 ≤ 1. The first best price is therefore a convex combination of the
prices that maximize profits in Market 1 and Market 2 respectively. Note that the
weights that are put on the two prices depend on the slopes of the inverse demand
functions b1 and b2 but not on the intercepts a1 and a2. This feature, which will
play an important role later on, is due to the fact that the cost of setting a price
p 6= aj/2 that is sub-optimal for Market j is decreasing in bj but independent of aj .
In particular, (1) shows that the smaller bj , the bigger the cost of setting p 6= aj/2.
Suppose now that Manager HQ does not observe the demand conditions but
retains the right to set prices. In this case Manager HQ first receives messages
m1 and m2 from the division managers and then sets the price that maximizes
E [π1 + π2 | m], where m = (m1,m2). This price is given by
pC = E
£
pFB | m¤ = 1
1 + b1/b2
E [a1 | m]
2
+
b1/b2
1 + b1/b2
E [a2 | m]
2
. (2)
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Suppose next that the pricing decision is delegated to Manager 1, then the chosen
price maximizes π1, and will thus be given by pD1 = a1/2. Note that the discrepancy
in the preferences between Manager HQ and Manager 1 is decreasing in b1/b2 ≤ 1.
Thus, the smaller b1/b2, the less biased is Manager 1’s decision-making. The
analysis of decision-making under Decentralization 2 is analogous. In particular,
pD2 = a2/2.
4 Strategic Communication
To understand strategic communication under Centralization, we first analyze the
division managers’ incentives to misrepresent information under this organizational
structure.
4.1 Incentives to Misrepresent
Consider the incentives of Manager 1 to misrepresent his information under Central-
ization. When she sets the price, Manager HQ puts less weight on setting it equal
to E [a1 | m] /2 and more weight on setting it equal to E [a2 | m] /2 than Manager
2 would like her to. Since E [a2] = μ2 this implies that if Manager 1 truthfully
communicated his state, he would expect headquarters to set a price that is too
close to μ2/2. To induce headquarters to set a price that is further away from
μ2/2, he therefore exaggerates the diﬀerence between his state and μ2, that is, he
reports m1 > a1 if a1 > μ2 and m1 < a1 if a1 < μ2. Only if a1 = μ2 does Manager
1 report his state truthfully.
To see this more formally, let ν1 = E [a1 | m1] be Manager HQ’s posterior
belief about a1 and suppose that Manager 1 can simply choose any ν1. Ideally,
Manager 1 would like Manager HQ to have the posterior that maximizes his ex-
pected payoﬀ which is given by
ν∗1 = argmaxν1
E
£
pHq1
¡
pH
¢ | a1¤ , (3)
where pH depends on v1 as defined in (2). In equilibrium the expected value of the
posterior of a2 is equal to μ2. Assuming that this relationship holds we can use (3)
to obtain
ν∗1 = a1 +
b1
b2
(a1 − μ2) . (4)
Since b1/b2 ≥ 0 this confirms the above intuition that Manager 2 exaggerates the
diﬀerence between his state a1 and μ2. Only when a1 = μ2 does he have an in-
centive to communicate truthfully. Moreover, it can be seen that his incentives to
exaggerate are increasing in |a1 − μ2| and in b1/b2. Essentially, the smaller b1/b2,
the more responsive price setting by headquarters is to the information it receives
about the demand conditions in the first market. Thus, the smaller b1/b2, the less
4
1 sμ +1 sμ − 2μ 1θ
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Figure 1: Communication Equilibria under Centralization.
Manager 1 has to exaggerate to influence decision-making in his favor. The analysis
of communication for Manager 2 is analogous.
4.2 Communication Equilibria
We can now build on our understanding of the managers’ incentives to misrepre-
sent their information to characterize the communication equilibria. We provide
an informal description of these equilibria in this section and relegate the formal
characterization to the Appendix.
As in Crawford and Sobel (1982), all communication equilibria are interval
equilibria in which the state spaces are partitioned into intervals and the division
managers only reveal which interval their local conditions a1 and a2 belong to. In
this sense the managers’ communication is noisy and information is lost. Consider
Manager 1’s communication strategies as illustrated in Figure 1. The states space
[μ1 − s, μ1 + s] is then partitioned into N ≥ 1 intervals that are small close to
a1 = μ2 and grow larger as |a1 − μ2| increases. Moreover, the stronger the incentives
to misrepresent information, as characterized by (4), the faster the intervals grow
as |a1 − μ2| increases and, hence, the more noisy is communication. To see this, let
ki and ki+1 denote the endpoints of i + 10s interval and suppose that this interval
lies to the right of μ2. It can be shown that the size of this interval (ki+1 − ki) is
equal to the length of the preceding interval (ki − ki−1) plus 4(b1/b2) (ki − μ2) .
There are many equilibria of the communication game. Indeed, any number
of partitions can be sustained in equilibrium. For the remainder of the paper we
focus on the equilibrium for which the number of partitions goes to infinity.
LEMMA 1. The most eﬃcient communication equilibrium under Centralization is
the one in which the number of partitions goes to infinity. For this equilibrium the
residual variances are given by
V Cj ≡ E
h
(aj − E [aj |mj ])2
i
=
¡
σ2 + (μ1 − μ2)2
¢ bj/bi
3 + 4bj/bi
,
where i, j = 1, 2 and i 6= j.
Proof: The proof of this proposition is analogous to those of Lemma 1 and Propo-
sition 2 in Alonso, Dessein and Matouschek (forthcoming). Details are available
from the authors upon request. ¥
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The residual variance is therefore directly related to the division managers’
incentives to misrepresent information as defined in (4). In particular, as b1/b2
increases, less information is communicated in equilibrium by Manager 1 to head-
quarters and the residual variance regarding a1 under Centralization increases. At
the same time, as b1/b2 increases, more information is communicated by Manager 2.
Since no informative communication takes place under decentralization, the residual
variances are respectively given by V D11 = 0 and V
D1
2 = σ
2 under Decentralization-1
and V D21 = σ
2 and V D22 = 0 under Decentralization-2.
5 Organizational Performance
Now that we have analyzed decision-making and communication, we can work out
the expected profits for each organizational structure.
LEMMA 2 Let Π∗ denote first best expected profits. Then, expected profits are
given by
Πl = Π∗ −AlV l1 −BlV l2 − Cl
¡
(μ1 − μ2)2 + 2σ2
¢
(5)
for l = C, D1, D2, where Al, Bl and Cl are functions of b1, b2 and λ only and are
defined in the proof.
We can use this proposition to compare the relative performance of the dif-
ferent organizational structures. For this purpose, it is useful to decompose the
benefit ΠD1−ΠC of delegating the pricing decision to Manager 1.6 The first compo-
nent is the gain in local information which captures the increase in expected profits
that is due to the pricing decision being based on better information about the
demand conditions in Market 1. Formally, the gain in local information is given by
ACV C1 ≥ 0. The second component is the loss of non-local information. This com-
ponent captures the reduction in expected profits that is due to the pricing decision
being based on worse information about the demand conditions in Market 2. For-
mally, the loss in non-local information is given by BC
¡
σ2 − V C2
¢
≥ 0. The third
and final component is the loss of control which is due to biased decision-making
by Manager 1 and is given by 2CD1σ2−
¡
BC −BD1
¢
σ2 ≥ 0. With this decomposi-
tion in hand, we now turn to a pairwise comparison of the diﬀerent organizational
structures.
Decentralization-1 versus Decentralization-2: Suppose first that the slopes of
the inverse demand functions are the same in both markets, that is, b1/b2 = 1. In
this case headquarters is indiﬀerent between delegating to Manager 1 and delegating
to Manager 2. Note that this is the case even if one market is on average much
larger than the other, that is, even if there are large diﬀerences between μ1 and
μ2. To understand this, recall from our discussion of the profit function (1) that
the reduction in profits in Market j = 1, 2 from setting the price diﬀerent from the
6The analysis for Manager 2 is analogous.
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price that maximizes profits in Market j is independent of aj and only depends on
bj . When b1 = b2 it is therefore as important to adapt the price to the conditions
in a small market as to those in a larger market.
While the two decentralized structures perform equally well when b1/b2 = 1,
headquarters is better oﬀ delegating to Manager 1 than delegating to Manager 2
whenever b1/b2 < 1, that is, whenever the inverse demand function in Market 1
is flatter than that in Market 2. This too can be understood by recalling our
discussion of the profit function (1) which showed that the cost of not adapting
prices to the demand conditions in Market j = 1, 2 is decreasing in bj . Thus, when
b1/b2 < 1 it is more important to adapt the pricing decisions to the conditions in
Market 1 than to those in Market 2.
PROPOSITION 1. Delegating pricing to Manager 1 is strictly preferred over dele-
gating pricing to Manager 2 if and only if b1 < b2, regardless of μ1 or μ2.7
Centralization versus Decentralization-1: To compare the centralized with
the decentralized structure, it is useful to define
R ≡
³
(μ1 − μ2)2 + σ2
´
/
³
(μ1 − μ2)2 + 2σ2
´
Inspection of (5) shows that the relative performance of the diﬀerent organizational
structures depend on μ1, μ2 and σ2 only through R.
Suppose first that μ1 = μ2 in which case R = 1/2. Note that in this case the
relative performance of the diﬀerent organizational structures depend only on the
relative slopes b1/b2 and not on the variance σ2. In particular, Decentralization-1
is then optimal whenever b1/b2 is suﬃciently small. In contrast, Centralization is
optimal if the flatness in demand is relatively similar in both markets. Intuitively,
delegating control to Manager 1 results in a gain of local information (regarding
Market 1), but a loss in non-local information (regarding Market 2) and a loss of
control (as Manager 1 is biased). For b1/b2 = 1, the gain in local information equals
the loss in non-local information. The additional loss of control under delegation
then implies that Centralization is optimal. When b1/b2 becomes smaller, however,
this loss of control decreases as there is less discrepancy between the price preferred
by headquarters and that by Manager 1. Similarly, as b1/b2 becomes smaller, the
gain in local information increases relative to the loss in non-local information.
Whenever b˙1/b2 is suﬃciently small, decentralization is then optimal.
Suppose next that μ1 6= μ2. The term (μ1 − μ2)2 can then be seen as
a measure of conflict between division managers regarding the preferred price p.
From Lemma 1, increased conflict between division managers reduces the quality
of communication under Centralization. As such, it both increases the gain of local
7Recall that we assume that μi − s ≥ 0 and (μi − μj)2 ≤ s2, which puts restrictions how small
each market can be and on diﬀerences in demand. Proposition 1 further assumes that it is always
optimal to sell in both markets.
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information and it reduces the loss in non-local information associated with dele-
gating to Manager 1, two factors favoring delegation. On the downside, increased
conflict also leads to more biased decision-making by Manager, which is reflected
in an increase in the loss of control. As the next proposition shows, the increase
in the gain of local information and reduction in the loss of non-local information
dominates, so that more conflict always makes it weakly more attractive to delegate
to Manager 1 :
PROPOSITION 2. Delegating pricing to Manger 1 is strictly preferred over cen-
tralized price setting if and only if b1/b2 < β, where β ∈ (0, 1) is increasing in R
and thus also in (μ1 − μ2)2 .
6 Conclusion
This paper links organizational design to market demand. When markets are char-
acterized by a flatter demand curve, getting the price "right" is more important.
When local managers are better informed about local demand conditions, delegating
pricing to the manager who faces the flattest demand may then be optimal, even if
his market has less expected sales. Increased conflict between managers also makes
decentralized pricing more likely. Intuitively, more conflict makes communication
with headquarters more noisy, and hence central decision-making less eﬀective. In
our set-up, the need for coordination is absolute: only one price can be charged.
In future work, we aim to relax this assumption by analyzing price coordination
between substitute or complement products.
7 Appendix
A communication equilibrium under Centralization is characterized by communica-
tion rules for the division managers and by a decision rule and belief functions for
Manager HQ. The communication rule for Manager j = 1, 2 specifies the probability
of sending message mj ∈Mj conditional on observing state aj and we denote it by
μj (mj | aj). The decision rules map messages m1 ∈ M1 and m2 ∈ M2 into prices
and we denote it by by p(m). Finally, the belief functions are denoted by gj (aj | mj)
for j = 1, 2 and state the probability of state aj conditional on observing message
mj . We focus on Perfect Bayesian Equilibria of the communication subgame which
require that (i.) communication rules are optimal for the division managers given
the decision rule, (ii.) the decision rule is optimal for Manager HQ given the belief
functions and (iii.) the belief functions are derived from the communication rules
using Bayes’ rule whenever possible.
PROPOSITION A1 (Communication Equilibria). For every positive integers N j
and N j , j = 1, 2, there exists at least one equilibrium (μ1(·), μ2(·), p(·), g1(·), g2(·)),
where
8
i. μj(mj | aj) is uniform, supported on [kj,i−1, kj,i] if aj ∈ (kj,i−1, kj,i),
ii. gj(aj | mj) is uniform supported on [kj,i−1, kj,i] if mj ∈ (kj,i−1, kj,i),
iii.a. k1,i+1 − k1,i = k1,i − k1,i−1 + 4b1/b2 (k1,i − μ2) for i = 1, ..., N1 − 1
k1,−i − k1,−(i+1) = k1,−(i−1) − k1,−i + 4b1/b2 (μ2 − k1,i) for i = 1, ..., N1 − 1,
iii.b. k2,i+1 − k2,i = k2,i − k2,i−1 + 4b2/b1 (k2,i − μ1) for i = 1, ..., N2 − 1
k2,−i − k2,−(i+1) = k2,−(i−1) − k2,−i + 4b2/b1 (μ1 − k2,i) for i = 1, ...,N2 − 1
iii.c. k1,−N1 = k2,−N2 = μ− s, k1,N1 = k2,N2 = μ+ s, k1,0 = μ2 and k2,0 = μ1.
iv. p(m) = pH , where pH is given by (2).
Moreover, all other finite equilibria have relationships between a1 and a2 and Man-
ager HQ’s choice of p that are the same as those in this class for some value of
N1, N2, N1 and N2; they are therefore economically equivalent.
Proof: The proof of this proposition is analogous to that of Proposition 1 in
Alonso, Dessein and Matouschek (forthcoming). Details are available from the
authors upon request. ¥
Proof of Lemma 2: Substituting p = pDj , j = 1, 2, into (1) and taking expecta-
tions gives
ΠDj = Π∗ − bj
4bi (b1 + b2)
³
(μ1 − μ2)2 + 2σ2
´
for i = 1, 2, i 6= j.
Thus, ADj = BDj = 0 and CDj = bj/ [4bi (b1 + b2)].
Similarly, substituting p = pH into (1) and taking expectations gives, after
some cumbersome manipulations,
ΠH = Π∗ − b2
4b1 (b1 + b2)
V C1 −
b1
4b2 (b1 + b2)
V C2 .
Thus AC = b2/ [4b1 (b1 + b2)], BC = b1/ [4b2 (b1 + b2)] and CC = 0. ¥
Proof of Proposition 1: From Lemma 2 it follows that
ΠD1 −ΠD2 = b2 − b1
4b1b2
³
(μ1 − μ2)2 + 2σ2
´
. ¥
Proof of Proposition 2: From Lemma 2 it follows that
ΠH −ΠD1 = (μ1 − μ2)
2 + 2σ2
4 (b1 + b2)
"
(b1/b2)− 2R
3 (b1/b2) + 2 (b1/b2)2 + 2
(3 (b1/b2) + 4) (4 (b1/b2) + 3)
#
.
The term in squared brackets is negative at b1/b2 = 0, positive at b1/b2 = 1 and
strictly increasing in b1/b2. Thus, there exists a unique β ∈ (0, 1) such that
ΠH − ΠD1 < 0 if b1/b2 < β, ΠH − ΠD1 = 0 if b1/b2 = β and ΠH − ΠD1 > 0 if
b1/b2 > β. Moreover, it is easily shown that β is increasing in R. ¥
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